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We  study  the  effects  of  credit  shocks  in  a  model  with  heterogeneous  entrepreneurs, 
ﬁnancing constraints, and a realistic ﬁrm-size distribution. As entrepreneurial ﬁrms can 
grow only slowly and rely heavily on retained earnings to expand the size of their business, 
we show that, by reducing entrepreneurial ﬁrm size and earnings, negative shocks have 
a very persistent effect on real activity. In determining the speed of recovery from an 
adverse economic shock, the most important factor is the extent to which the shock erodes 
entrepreneurial wealth.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC 
BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
1. Introduction
The recent turmoil in ﬁnancial markets has had deep consequences for the allocation of credit within the economy. 
Access to credit is particularly important for nascent and growing ﬁrms, for which it is much more diﬃcult to rely only on 
retained earnings as a source of ﬁnancing.
In this paper, we study the effects of various types of ﬁnancial shocks in a model with two nonﬁnancial sectors: a cor-
porate sector, primarily composed of mature ﬁrms, and an entrepreneurial sector, whose leverage is limited by its inability 
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Fig. 1. Credit ﬂows to corporate and noncorporate ﬁrms (ratio to GDP).
to fully commit to repay debts. The constraints generate a large, and realistic, dispersion in ﬁrm size, and limit the rate at 
which entrepreneurial ﬁrms can grow. We build on the entrepreneurship model of Quadrini (2000) and Cagetti and De Nardi 
(2006, 2009), and introduce a ﬁnancial intermediation sector that channels resources from savers to users of capital. Both 
entrepreneurs and corporate ﬁrms require access to intermediated funds. The reliance of entrepreneurs on intermediaries is 
one of the parameters used in our calibration and is most associated with matching the ratio of the wealth of entrepreneurs 
to that of workers. We calibrate directly the reliance of corporate ﬁrms on outside funding to match data from the ﬂow of 
funds.
Our main experiment considers the effects of an increase in the cost of channeling funds through intermediaries, which 
increases the cost of borrowing and, in general equilibrium, also depresses the rate of return earned by savers. This shock 
can be the result of either a negative productivity shock in the ﬁnancial intermediation sector, or the destruction of capital 
speciﬁc to this sector (e.g., the loss in value of mortgage-backed securities). For the parameters that best match our tar-
get moments, we ﬁnd that entrepreneurial ﬁrms are affected to a deeper extent than corporate ﬁrms. To the extent that 
entrepreneurial ﬁrms tend to be smaller, this is in line with the empirical ﬁndings of Gertler and Gilchrist (1994). When 
intermediation costs return to their steady-state levels, both entrepreneurs and corporate ﬁrms stage an initial rebound, 
but the path to a full recovery is then slow. The wealth accumulation of the entrepreneurs is affected in a very persistent 
way. Negative credit shocks reduce ﬁrm size, and, because entrepreneurial ﬁrms can grow only slowly, limit the speed at 
which ﬁrms return to their previous scale when the shocks subside. This slow transition is characterized by more capital 
misallocation and, hence, lower output than in steady state.
A key prediction of our model is that the effects of adverse shocks are more persistent on small businesses. There 
is some evidence showing that this is the case. Credit ﬂows to small and large businesses after the ﬁnancial crisis have 
behaved in very different ways. According to the Financial Accounts of the Unites States, credit ﬂows to both corporate and 
noncorporate ﬁrms (the latter mostly small businesses) dropped sharply during the ﬁnancial crisis. However, credit ﬂows 
to corporations resumed relatively early in 2010 and went back to healthy levels by 2011, as corporate ﬁrms could access 
various credit markets (such as the bond market). Credit to noncorporate businesses continued to decline through 2010 
and started rising only slowly thereafter. The same pattern emerges markedly for the recession of 1990–91, and, to a lesser 
extent, for most recessions in the past 50 years, as documented in Fig. 1.
In turn, credit availability and credit ﬂows have an impact on ﬁrms’ growth. Chodorow-Reich (2014) shows that ﬁrms that 
had banking relations with less healthy banks not only had more diﬃculty obtaining credit after the crisis, but saw larger 
declines in employment. Interestingly, this effect is larger for smaller ﬁrms. Similarly, according to surveys conducted by the 
National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), the crisis had a long-lasting impact on small ﬁrms’ investment plans. 
The net percentage of ﬁrms that planned capital outlays and that of ﬁrms that anticipated business expansions plummeted 
during the recession and has increased only slightly in recent years, a much smaller recovery than that seen in aggregate 
data on investment.1 A similar pattern appears in the previous two recessions. These indexes dropped sharply during the 
recession, but returned to their pre-recession levels more slowly than aggregate data on investment would suggest.
Our model is also consistent with the differential behavior of employment at ﬁrms of different sizes during the latest 
recession and recovery, documented also by Siemer (2013). Employment at smaller ﬁrms fell more sharply than at larger 
1 See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2012).M. Bassetto et al. / Review of Economic Dynamics 18 (2015) 53–76 55
ﬁrms during the recession, and, since then, the ratio of employment at small ﬁrms (relative to large ﬁrms) has remained 
depressed and hasn’t returned yet to pre-recession levels.
In our model, an increase in intermediation costs also generates an endogenous tightening of borrowing constraints, as 
entrepreneurial activity becomes less proﬁtable and the outside option of absconding part of the capital becomes compara-
tively more attractive; this channel accounts for about 50% of the drop in entrepreneurial ﬁrm size.
Government policy interacts with the ﬁnancial disruption. We study two aspects of this interaction. First, the recession 
initiated by the ﬁnancial shock creates a shortfall in the government budget. If income taxes are raised to ﬁnance this 
shortfall, they constitute a new, independent drain on entrepreneurial proﬁts; this drain can be even bigger than the ﬁnan-
cial shock itself, leading to an even longer recovery. Second, we analyze the effects of a government-targeted intervention in 
ﬁnancial markets that drives a wedge in the cost of funds across different classes of borrowers. Our experiment is closest in 
spirit to the U.S. Treasury’s guarantee of money market mutual funds (and implicitly of the underlying commercial paper): 
We consider a case in which the government is able to completely and costlessly insulate the corporate sector from the 
shock.2 This guarantee is helpful in reducing the depth of the recession, but it does nothing to improve the recovery, as it 
concentrates the shock in the sector that is most vulnerable in the long run.
We contrast the effects of our baseline shock with alternative scenarios, such as a collateral shock, that makes it harder 
for entrepreneurs to pledge future repayment of debt, similar to Jermann and Quadrini (2007), or a traditional shock to total 
factor productivity (TFP). We ﬁnd that the response to these shocks may be quite similar, to the extent that the balance 
sheet of entrepreneurs is hit in a similar way; the evolution of this balance sheet is the key element that affects the speed 
of the recovery. In our set-up, all these shocks have a very persistent effect on real activity.
2. Related works
Many works incorporate credit-market frictions in macroeconomic models but, rather than studying the direct effect 
of shocks to these frictions, they focus on how these frictions affect aggregate investment and help generate and am-
plify business ﬂuctuations. Among the earliest and most inﬂuential contributions, Bernanke and Gertler (1989) introduce 
agency problems such as costly state veriﬁcation in a dynamic general equilibrium set-up, and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
further illustrate the impact of collateral constraints and their interaction with asset prices and ﬁrms’ net worth. In both 
papers, credit imperfections link investment decisions to the ﬁrms’ balance sheets and generate a “ﬁnancial accelerator” 
that ampliﬁes and propagates shocks to the macroeconomy. The recent ﬁnancial crisis has given further impetus to this 
literature, highlighting both the many channels through which credit market imperfections can affect real activity and the 
possible effects of government interventions to improve the functioning of credit markets and the ﬂow of funds between 
borrowers and lenders. For a review of this literature, see Bernanke et al. (1999) for earlier contributions and Gertler and 
Kiyotaki (2010), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), and Krishnamurthy (2010) for more recent ones. Here, we only mention 
a few of the papers most related to our work.
We model several types of ﬁnancial frictions. Financial intermediation (and more in general frictions in credit markets) 
introduces a wedge between the returns to lenders and the cost of capital to borrowers, a wedge related to the spread 
between liquid and easily intermediated securities such as Treasuries and corporate bonds. These credit spreads vary over 
time and their level and variation have been shown to be empirically correlated to and potentially key to understanding 
output ﬂuctuations (for instance, Gilchrist et al., 2010; Christiano et al., 2010; Adrian and Shin, 2010). Their role has been 
highlighted, among others, by Hall (2011), who shows that in a simple representative-agent economy, credit spreads (includ-
ing those for households) are powerful determinants of economic activity and can generate ﬂuctuations of the magnitude of 
those seen in the recent crisis, and by Curdia and Woodford (2010), who study how monetary policy rules should respond 
to shocks to credit spreads. We also ﬁnd that spreads have a signiﬁcant impact on aggregate output during a credit crisis; by 
themselves, spreads have a fairly short-lived effect in our model economy. It is a different source of frictions that propagates 
the effect of spreads and generates a very persistent drop in output.
Among borrowers, we explicitly distinguish corporate and entrepreneurial ﬁrms, since these two types of ﬁrms react to 
shocks in different ways in the data, and credit disruptions are likely to have a differential impact on the two (see, for 
example, Quadrini, 1999). We model credit frictions to entrepreneurs as endogenous borrowing constraints arising from 
imperfect enforceability of debt contracts (as in Kehoe and Levine, 1993; Alvarez and Jermann, 2000). In this set-up, credit 
availability to entrepreneurs depends on their balance sheet and their available collateral. The presence of limited commit-
ment slows the growth of nascent ﬁrms and links it to the entrepreneurs’ cash ﬂow. It is this channel that propagates the 
initial ﬁnancial shock in our model and is responsible for our main results. Our paper is thus also closely related to Khan 
and Thomas (2013), who examine the effect of capital misallocation that results from a collateral requirement shock in a 
real business-cycle model with heterogeneous ﬁrms and capital rigidities. Compared to their work, we focus more closely 
on small entrepreneurs that own their ﬁrm and thus face a consolidated resource constraint to ﬁnance investment and 
consumption. For these entrepreneurs, rebuilding the ﬁrm’s balance sheet comes directly at the expense of their own con-
sumption, which slows down the adjustment more than in the case of a corporate ﬁrm owned by diversiﬁed shareholders.
2 The government guarantee of money market mutual funds was indeed costless ex-post for the United States in the recent crisis; we choose a costless 
speciﬁcation not because we believe that it was costless ex-ante, but to show that this guarantee is not a panacea even in the best-case scenario.56 M. Bassetto et al. / Review of Economic Dynamics 18 (2015) 53–76
The  differential  impact  of  credit  frictions  on  businesses  of  different  sizes  has  been  shown  to  be  useful  in  explain-
ing a variety of phenomena, for instance ﬁrm-size distribution (Athreya and Akyol, 2009; Monge, 2009), ﬁrm dynamics 
(Albuquerque and Hopenhayn, 2004), macroeconomic ﬂuctuations (Cooley et al., 2004; Jermann and Quadrini, 2012), and 
growth (Buera and Shin, 2013). More broadly, the interaction between frictions, entrepreneurship, and inequality is crucial 
to understanding the response to macroeconomic shocks (Jermann and Quadrini, 2007), the effect of certain government 
policies (Cagetti and De Nardi, 2009; Meh, 2005; Kitao, 2008), and asset pricing (Heaton and Lucas, 2000; Roussanov, 2010;
Covas and Fujita, 2011). Shourideh and Zetlin-Jones (2012) report that as much as 90% of investment by private businesses 
is ﬁnanced by outside funding. In our economy too, a substantial fraction of small-business investment is undertaken with 
borrowed funds, although this number is between 50% and 75%. Compared to their work, we have different deﬁnitions of 
businesses: We look at self-employed entrepreneurs who actively manage their business, whereas they focus on the uni-
verse of private businesses. For our class of entrepreneurs, the distinction between personal assets and business assets is 
tenuous as, for example, private assets are frequently used as collateral for the business.
3. The model
3.1. Demographics
A young person faces a constant probability of aging during each period (1 − πy), and an old person faces a constant 
probability of dying during each period (1 − πo). When an old person dies, his offspring enters the model, carrying the 
assets bequeathed to him by the parent.
3.2. Preferences
The household’s ﬂow of utility from consumption is given by 
c
1−σ
t
1−σ . The households discount the future at rate β and are 
perfectly altruistic toward their descendants.
3.3. Technology
Each person possesses two types of ability, which we take to be exogenous, stochastic, positively autocorrelated, and 
stochastically independent of each other. Entrepreneurial ability (θt) is the capacity to invest capital and labor more or less 
productively using one’s own production function. Working ability (yt) is the capacity to produce income out of labor by 
working for others.
The entrepreneurs can borrow, invest capital, hire labor, and run a technology whose return depends on their own 
entrepreneurial ability: those with higher ability levels have higher average and marginal returns from capital and labor. 
When the entrepreneur invests kt, production is given by
f(kt,nt) = θt
 
k
γ
t (1+nt)(1−γ) ν,
where ν, γ ∈[ 0, 1], and n is hired labor (n ≥ 0). We normalize the labor of the entrepreneur to 1. Entrepreneurs thus face 
decreasing returns from investment, as their managerial skills become gradually stretched over larger and larger projects 
(as in Lucas, 1978). While entrepreneurial ability is exogenously given, the entrepreneurial rate of return from investing in 
capital is endogenous and is a function of the size of the project that the entrepreneur implements.
There is no within-period uncertainty regarding the returns of the entrepreneurial project. The ability θt is observable 
and known by all at the beginning of the period. We therefore abstract from problems arising from partial observability, 
costly state veriﬁcation, and from diversiﬁcation of entrepreneurial risk.
In addition to entrepreneurs, there is also a non-entrepreneurial sector, represented by a standard Cobb–Douglas produc-
tion function:
F
 
K
c
t ,L
c
t
 
= A
 
K
c
t
 α 
L
c
t
 1−α, (1)
where  Kc
t and  Lc
t are the total capital and labor inputs in the non-entrepreneurial sector, and  A is a constant. In both 
sectors, capital depreciates at a rate δ.
3.4. Credit
External ﬁnancing to both entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurial ﬁrms is provided by competitive ﬁnancial interme-
diaries.  The  intermediaries  borrow  funds  from  workers  (and  possibly  entrepreneurs,  though  in  equilibrium  almost  all 
entrepreneurs will be credit constrained and will invest all their wealth in their own ﬁrm).
Intermediation is costly. Each unit of capital requires φt units of the consumption good as an intermediate input. This 
parameter captures in a stylized way the transaction costs of acting through intermediaries, but especially the monitoring 
costs, both those borne by intermediaries that lend their funds to ﬁrms and those that savers incur in gathering information 
about the intermediaries. In the context of the recent crisis, we view the impairment of the banks’ balance sheets and the M. Bassetto et al. / Review of Economic Dynamics 18 (2015) 53–76 57
corresponding scarcity in their capital as an important source of this increased cost, leaving scope for further research on 
the frictions that prevent a prompt reﬁnancing of the banking sector.3
Financial intermediaries operate competitively. At any time t, they take as given the interest rate required by savers 
(it) and the interest rate paid by borrowers (rt). Given the technology, an equilibrium with a positive and ﬁnite supply of 
intermediation requires
rt = it +φt. (2)
We assume that the non-entrepreneurial sector must ﬁnance a given fraction ξt of its capital through external borrowing. 
This constraint can be justiﬁed by an agency problem between shareholders and managers.
The entrepreneurial demand for borrowed funds arises endogenously in the model. As in Kehoe and Levine (1993), 
entrepreneurs are subject to borrowing constraints that are endogenously determined in equilibrium and stem from the 
assumptions that contracts are imperfectly enforceable.
In particular, as in Cagetti and De Nardi (2006), we assume that the entrepreneurs who borrow either can invest the 
money and repay their debt at the end of the period or can run away without investing it and be workers for one period. 
In the latter case, they retain a fraction  f of their working capital kt (which includes own assets and borrowed money) and 
their creditors seize the rest. We assume that labor services are paid at the end of the period, hence entrepreneurs are not 
constrained in the amount of labor that they hire. The parameter  f captures parsimoniously all the sources of disruption 
that limit an entrepreneur’s ability to continue his ﬁrm after defaulting on its debt obligations. In our model, the tightness 
of borrowing constraints is closely connected to an entrepreneur’s incentive to save, and we will thus rely on moments of 
the wealth distribution to calibrate this parameter.
3.5. Government and taxation
The government is inﬁnitely lived. It levies taxes, pays a pension pt to each retiree, provides a certain level gt of public 
purchases (which do not enter the households’ utility function), repays existing debt with interest, and issues new debt. 
In steady state, tax revenues from income, consumption, and estate taxes are equal to government purchases, pension 
payments, and interest payments on the debt.
We model progressive taxation of total income as in Cagetti and De Nardi (2009) and use their parameter estimates.
Total income taxes paid by each household are given by
T
i
t(Yt) =τ
i(Yt)Yt +τ
s
t Yt,
where i indicates occupational choice (e or w). τ s
t represents an additional ﬂat rate that is allowed to adjust to meet the 
government budget constraint. The government also levies a sales tax on consumption, at rate τc. Estates larger than a given 
value e are taxed at rate τb on the amount in excess of e.
As a ﬁrst pass, we abstract from the tax implications of corporate ﬁnance decisions by assuming that corporate income 
taxes are zero and that capital gains are taxed as regular income.4
3.6. The corporate ﬁrms’ problem
In each period t, a corporate ﬁrm starts with resources AC
t , which include undepreciated capital from last period, retained 
earnings, and last period’s equity issuance. The ﬁrm uses AC
t and new debt (external) ﬁnancing Bt to purchase capital for 
operation in period t (KC
t ), subject to the minimum external ﬁnance constraint
Bt ≥ ξK
C
t . (3)
Residual internal funds can be invested with ﬁnancial intermediaries at the rate it.
Since corporate ﬁrms will always be owned by savers (workers), their objective function is to maximize the discounted 
sum of proﬁts, using the interest rate it as a discount factor.
Formally, the problem a ﬁrm faces as of period t is described recursively as follows:
Jt
 
A
C
t
 
= max
KC
t ,LC
t ,Bt,AC
t+1
F
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t ,L
C
t
 
+
 
A
C
t + Bt − K
C
t
 
(1+ it)− wtL
C
t
−(1+rt)Bt −δK
C
t − A
C
t+1 +
1
1+ it+1
Jt+1
 
A
C
t+1
 
, (4)
subject to
K
C
t ≤ A
C
t + Bt (5)
3 On this subject, see e.g. Gertler et al. (2012).
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and (3). In Eq. (4),  Jt represents the cum-dividend value of the ﬁrm’s equity in terms of period-t goods. In period t, the 
ﬁrm’s proﬁts are given by F(K C
t , LC
t ) + (AC
t + Bt − KC
t )(1 + it) − wtLC
t − (1 + rt)Bt − δKC
t . Of these proﬁts, the ﬁrm retains 
AC
t+1 to ﬁnance future operations, and it pays out the rest as dividends (with negative dividends corresponding to new 
equity issuance).
It is straightforward to verify that the ﬁrms’ problem is homogeneous of degree 1 in  AC
t . This implies that the size 
distribution of corporate ﬁrms is irrelevant and we can work with one representative (competitive) ﬁrm. It also implies that 
the ﬁrm’s value is proportional to its initial internal funds:  Jt(AC
t ) ≡ ˆ Jt AC
t . Using ˆ to denote the optimal choice rescaled by 
AC
t and denoting by ω1t and ω2t the Lagrange multipliers on (5) and (3), respectively, the ﬁrst-order conditions that will 
hold if the corporate sector is active yield:
FK
  ˆ K
C
t , ˆ L
C
t
 
−δ = 1+ it +ω1t +ξω2t,
FL
  ˆ K
C
t , ˆ L
C
t
 
= wt,
rt − it =ω1t +ω2t, (6)
and
1 =
ˆ Jt+1
1+ it+1
. (7)
For t > 0, the envelope condition yields
ˆ Jt = 1+ it +ω1t
From these equations, for period t > 1w e  obtain
FK
  ˆ K
C
t , ˆ L
C
t
 
= δ +(1−ξ)it +ξrt. (8)
In the initial period, the internal funds of the corporate sector (AC
1) are exogenously given. Depending on its value and 
factor prices, the corporate ﬁrms’ optimization problem yields
FK
  ˆ K
C
1, ˆ L
C
1
 
−δ
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎩
= r1 if ˆ K1 > 1
1−ξ
∈[ (1−ξ)i1 +ξr1,r1] if ˆ K1 = 1
1−ξ
= (1−ξ)i1 +ξr1 if ˆ K1 < 1
1−ξ .
(9)
Given our assumptions, the timing of dividend payments does not matter. Whether dividends are kept by the ﬁrm as 
retained earnings or distributed and invested by ﬁrm owners, they yield the same rate of return it. For this reason, we 
assume that the corporate sector has enough retained earnings so that  ˆ K1 < 1/(1 − ξ), even when faced with the shocks 
described below.5 In this case, Eq. (9) coincides with Eq. (8), and we obtain  ˆ J1 = 1 + i1. A corollary of this result is that 
ﬁrm owners will not have unexpected capital gains (or losses) when the shock occurs. This allows us to only keep track of 
their total assets invested with third parties, without distinguishing between ﬁrm stock, funds invested with intermediaries, 
and government debt.
3.7. Households
Each young individual starts the period with assets at, entrepreneurial ability θt, and worker ability  yt, and chooses 
whether to be an entrepreneur or a worker during the current period.
An old entrepreneur who is still able to run a business can decide to keep the activity going or retire, while a retiree 
cannot start a new entrepreneurial activity.
The young The value function of a young person is
Vt(at, yt,θ t) = max
 
V
e
t (at, yt,θ t), V
w
t (at, yt,θ t)
 
,
where V e
t (at, yt, θt) is the value function of a young individual who manages an entrepreneurial activity during the current 
period. The term V w
t (at, yt, θt) is the value function if he chooses to be a worker during the current period.
The young entrepreneur’s problem can be written as
V
e
t (at, yt,θ t) = max
ct,kt,nt,at+1
 
u(ct)+βπyEtVt+1(at+1, yt+1,θ t+1)+β(1−πy)EtWt+1(at+1,θ t+1)
 
,
5 In a stochastic model, corporate ﬁrms would ﬁnd it optimal to accumulate ﬁnancial assets and to ensure that the condition above is satisﬁed, since a 
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subject to
Y
e
t = θ
 
k
γ
t (1+nt)(1−γ) ν −δkt −(kt −at)(rtIkt>at + itIkt<at)− wtnt (10)
at+1 = Y
e
t − T
e
t
 
Y
e
t
 
+at −
 
1+τ
c
t
 
ct (11)
u(ct)+βπyEtVt+1(at+1, yt+1,θ t+1)+β(1−πy)EtWt+1(at+1,θ t+1) ≥ V
w
t ( fk t, yt,θ t) (12)
at ≥ 0 (13)
nt ≥ 0 (14)
kt ≥ 0. (15)
The term Y e
t represents the entrepreneur’s total proﬁts. The expected value of the value function is taken with respect 
to (yt+1, θt+1), conditional on (yt, θt). The term Wt(at+1, θt+1), deﬁned below, is the value function of the old entrepreneur 
at the beginning of the period, before deciding whether to stay in business or retire.
Eq. (12) formalizes the endogenous borrowing constraint discussed in Section 3.4. The left-hand side is the value of 
investing the amount borrowed and running the ﬁrm. This value must be greater than the utility associated with running 
away with the capital. We assume that, if this happens, creditors can only seize a fraction 1 − f of the capital of the ﬁrm, 
while the household retains a fraction  f . We also assume that the household can be a worker for the period, earning 
income y. There is no default memory, and defaulting on debt does not preclude, or affect, potential borrowing in future 
periods.
For workers, we have
V
w
t (at, yt,θ t) = max
ct,at+1
 
u(ct)+βπyEtVt+1(at+1, yt+1,θ t+1)+β(1−πy)W
r
t+1(at+1)
 
, (16)
subject to Eq. (13) and
Y
w
t = wt yt + itat (17)
at+1 = (1+ it)at − T
w
t
 
Y
w
t
 
−
 
1+τ
c
t
 
ct, (18)
where wt is the equilibrium wage rate.
The old Since the old entrepreneur can choose to continue the entrepreneurial activity or retire, his state variables are his 
current assets at and his entrepreneurial ability level θt.6 His value function is given by
Wt(at,θ t) = max
 
W
e
t (at,θ t),W
r
t(at)
 
, (19)
where W e
t (at, θt) is the value function for the old entrepreneur who stays in business, and W r
t (at) is the value function of 
the old retired person. Deﬁne the inherited assets, net of estate taxes, as an
t+1 = at+1 −τb
t+1 max(0,  at+1 − et+1). We have
W
e
t (at,θ t) = max
ct,kt,nt,at+1
 
u(ct)+βπoEtWt+1(at+1,θ t+1)+β(1−πo)EtVt+1
 
a
n
t+1, yt+1,θ t+1
  
, (20)
subject to Eq. (10), Eq. (11), Eq. (13), Eq. (14), Eq. (15) and
u(ct)+βπoEtWt+1(at+1,θ t+1)+β(1−πo)EtVt+1
 
a
n
t+1, yt+1,θ t+1
 
≥ W
r
t( fk t). (21)
The child of an entrepreneur is born with ability level (θt+1, yt+1). The expected value of the child’s value function with 
respect to yt+1 is computed using the invariant distribution of yt, while the one with respect to θt+1 is conditional on the 
parent’s θt and evolves according to the same Markov process that each person faces for θt while alive. This is justiﬁed by 
the assumption that the child of an entrepreneur inherits the parent’s ﬁrm.
A retired person (who is not an entrepreneur) receives pensions and social security payments (pt) and consumes his 
assets. His value function is
W
r
t(at) = max
ct,at+1
 
u(ct)+βπoW
r
t+1(at+1)+β(1−πo)EtVt+1
 
a
n
t+1, yt+1,θ t+1
  
, (22)
subject to Eq. (13) and
at+1 = (1+ it)at + pt − T
w
t (pt + itat)−
 
1+τ
c
t
 
ct. (23)
The expected value of the child’s value function is taken with respect to the invariant distribution of yt and θt.
6 We assume that the option of continuing is only open to entrepreneurs that have not lost their entrepreneurial skill. We rule out the possibility that 
an old person with θt = 0 chooses not to retire to preserve the future option of starting a new business should θt revert to the higher level.60 M. Bassetto et al. / Review of Economic Dynamics 18 (2015) 53–76
3.8. Equilibrium deﬁnition
Let xt = (at, yt, θt, zt) be the state vector, where z distinguishes young workers, young entrepreneurs, old entrepreneurs, 
and old retired. From the decision rules that solve the maximization problem and the exogenous Markov process for income 
and entrepreneurial ability, we can derive a transition function Mt(xt, ·), which provides the probability distribution of xt+1
(the state next period), conditional on the current state xt.
An equilibrium is given by the following elements at any time t:
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
interest rates rt,it, a wage rate wt,
taxes
 
T w(.), T e(.),τc,τ s
t ,τb 
and a bequest exemption level e,
Social Security payments pt,
allocations ct(x), and at(x), occupational choices,
entrepreneurial labor hiring nt(x) and investments kt(x),
and a distribution of people over the state variables xt : mt(x),
such that, given it, rt, wt, and government taxes and transfer schedules:
• The functions ct, at, nt and kt solve the maximization problems described above.
• The amounts of labor and capital employed by the corporate sector satisfy (6) and (8).
• Financial intermediaries break even, that is, Eq. (2) holds.
• The value of corporate ﬁrms is given by (7).
• The labor market clears, that is, the total labor supplied by the workers equals the total labor employed in the non-
entrepreneurial sector and total labor hired by the entrepreneurs.
• The capital markets clear. Total household savings (inclusive of capital owned indirectly through the stock of corporate 
ﬁrms) are equal to the capital employed for production by the corporate sector and by the entrepreneurs, government 
debt, and the capital used by ﬁnancial intermediaries as an intermediate input.
• The government budget constraint balances in present value: Total taxes collected plus new debt issues equal govern-
ment purchases, transfers, and repayment of previously issued government debt (with interest):
   
T
x(Yx)+τ
cc(x)+ Io(x)τ
b(1−πo)· max
 
0,at+1(xt)− et
  
dmt(x) = ptπr + gt +(1+ it)Dt − Dt+1.
The integral is over all of the population, Io is an indicator function that is equal to one if the person is old and zero 
otherwise, and πr is the fraction of retired people in the population. In steady state, Dt = ¯ D.
• The government present-value budget constraint holds, i.e.,
lim
t→∞
Dt
t−1  
s=2
1
1+ is
= 0.
• The distribution of people mt is induced by the transition matrix of the system as follows
m 
t+1 = Mt(xt,·) m 
t.
In steady state, mt = m∗ is the invariant distribution for the economy and debt, prices, and government policies are 
constant and the individual’s decision rules are time-independent.
4. Calibration
In this section, we describe the parameters taken from the literature or estimated outside of the model (Table 1), and 
the moments we use to calibrate the remaining parameters (Tables 2 and 3).
4.1. Non-calibrated parameters
The coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion σ, the capital share in the non-entrepreneurial Cobb–Douglas production func-
tion α, and the depreciation rate δ are set to values commonly used in the literature (for instance, respectively, Attanasio et 
al., 1999; Stokey and Rebelo, 1995; Gollin, 2002).
The probabilities of aging and of dying are such that the average length of working life is 45 years and that of retirement 
is 11 years.
We assume that the logarithm of the workers’ income is an AR(1) process and approximate it as a 5-point Markov chain 
using the method in Tauchen and Hussey (1991). The autocorrelation coeﬃcient and the variance of the error term for 
the AR(1) process are chosen to obtain a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.95 (among others, Lillard and Willis, 1978) and a Gini 
coeﬃcient for earnings of 0.38 (Huggett, 1996; De Nardi, 2004).M. Bassetto et al. / Review of Economic Dynamics 18 (2015) 53–76 61
Table 1
Fixed parameters and their sources.
Parameter Value Source(s)
Preferences, technology, and demographics
σ 1.5 Attanasio et al. (1999)
δ 0.06 Stokey and Rebelo (1995)
α 0.33 Gollin (2002)
A 1 normalization
φ 0.015 Baa-Treasury spread
ξ 0.33 ﬂow of funds
πy 0.98 average working life: 45 years
πo 0.91 average retirement life: 11 years
Labor income process and Social Security payments
y, P y
p
see appendix in Cagetti and De Nardi (2009)
40% average yearly income
Huggett (1996), Lillard and Willis (1978)
Kotlikoff et al. (1999)
Public expenditure, government debt, and taxes
g 18.7% GDP NIPA
D see text Altig et al. (2001)
τc 11% Altig et al. (2001)
bw 0.32 Cagetti and De Nardi (2009)
be 0.26 Cagetti and De Nardi (2009)
sw 0.22 Cagetti and De Nardi (2009)
pw 0.76 Cagetti and De Nardi (2009)
pe 1.4 Cagetti and De Nardi (2009)
se 0.42 Cagetti and De Nardi (2009)
The Social Security replacement rate is 40% of average gross income (see Kotlikoff et al., 1999). The steady-state ratio of 
government spending to GDP is set to 18.7%, and the tax rate on consumption is 11%. All of these parameter choices are 
discussed in Cagetti and De Nardi (2009).
We set the steady-state ﬁnancial intermediation cost to obtain a 1.5% spread between the interest rate paid by borrowers 
and that received by lenders. This is calibrated to the historical average of the spread between Baa-rated companies and 
Treasuries. In our model, both public and private debt are risk free, and the spread is entirely due to the special liquidity 
role of Treasuries, which are assumed not to require any intermediation. For this reason, we choose to match our private 
borrowing rate to an empirical counterpart that features low default risk but is also unlikely to carry any liquidity premium 
(see Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012, for more discussion). As a comparison with other securities, the average 
spread between AAA-rated corporate bonds and Treasuries is about 1.25% and that between BBB-rated bonds and Treasuries 
is about 2.2%.
The parameter ξ, the constraint on debt ﬁnancing, is the average ratio of total corporate debt to the value of corporate 
tangible assets, a ratio equal to about 0.34 in the Flow of Funds Accounts. Corporate debt includes commercial paper, cor-
porate bonds, mortgages, and other loans; tangible assets include equipment and software (at replacement cost), structures 
(at market value), and inventories. The ratio has generally been increasing since the beginning of the data in 1950, from 
below 0.25 during the 1950’s to values near or above 0.5 in recent years. This ratio jumped to 0.58 immediately after the 
ﬁnancial crisis, as the crash in commercial real estate prices sharply reduced the value of tangible assets, but since 2009 the 
ratio has been trending down toward pre-recession norms.
For the average tax rate, we adopt the functional form suggested by Gouveia and Strauss (1994):
τ
i(Yt) = b
i −b
i 
s
iY
pi
t + 1
 − 1
pi . (24)
We estimate the relation separately for entrepreneurs and workers, using nonlinear least squares on 1989 PSID data. Our 
measure of total monetary income includes all forms of labor income, capital income, transfers, and income from en-
trepreneurial activities. Total federal taxes paid is the variable computed in the PSID (in our case, V18862 in the 1990 
ﬁle). The dependent variable in the regression, average tax rate, is the ratio of (PSID-estimated) federal taxes paid to total 
monetary income. To obtain a representative sample, we exclude the poverty and Latino samples. To obtain the appropriate 
tax rate for our model (in which the lowest income level is positive), we also drop all observations with income smaller 
than $1000 or negative taxes paid. We deﬁne as entrepreneurs those who declare themselves to be self-employed and own 
or have a ﬁnancial interest in a business activity. The resulting sample of entrepreneurs has very similar characteristics to 
those from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). Our estimates would be very similar if we were to assume a somewhat 
smaller or larger cutoff for the amount of business income received during the period.
For the other parameters, we take a ratio of government expenditures to GDP of 18.7% (NIPA data), a consumption tax 
of about 11% (Altig et al., 2001), and a level of government debt that, given the equilibrium interest rate, yields an average 
ratio of total interest payments to GDP of 3% (Altig et al., 2001).62 M. Bassetto et al. / Review of Economic Dynamics 18 (2015) 53–76
Table 2
Target values.
Target moment Target Model
Capital–output ratio 2.9–3.0 3.0
Percentage of entrepreneurs 7.5–7.6 7.7
Percentage of exiting entrepreneurs 22–24 22.4
Percentage of workers entering entrepreneurship 2.0–3.0 2.4
Median net worth of entrepreneurs to workers 5.3–6.5 6.2
Percentage of people at zero wealth 7–13 11.9
Percentage of entrepreneurs hiring on the labor market 57.4–64.6 58.8
R e v e n u ef r o me s t a t ea n dg i f tt a x e s( a s%o fo u t p u t ) 0 . 2 – 0 . 3 0 .27
Percentage of estates paying estate taxes 1.5–2.0 1.9
Table 3
Calibrated parameters.
Calibrated parameter Value
β 0.91
θ {0, 1.16}
Pθ see text
ν 0.88
γ 0.80
f 75%
τb 16%
e 120
4.2. Calibration targets
In previous work, Cagetti and De Nardi (2009) have discussed the relevant empirical counterpart to the concept of 
entrepreneur  in  this  model.  Our  entrepreneurs  are  the  self-employed  business  owners  that  actively  manage  their  own 
ﬁrm(s). We identify them in the SCF as those that declare that they are self-employed, that they own a business, and 
that they actively manage it.
We assume that the worker’s income ability process is independent from the entrepreneurial ability process (Cagetti 
and De Nardi, 2006, discuss how the results change with a different correlation coeﬃcient between the two processes). We 
consider only two values of entrepreneurial ability: zero (no entrepreneurial ability) and a positive number. This implies 
that Pθ is a two-by-two matrix. Since the rows have to sum to one, this gives us two parameters to calibrate. We also have 
to choose values for ν, the degree of decreasing returns to scale to entrepreneurial ability, γ , the share of income going to 
entrepreneurial working capital,  f , the fraction of working capital the entrepreneur can keep in case he defaults, the estate 
tax rate, and its corresponding exemption level.
In total, we calibrate nine parameters. We use the ﬁrst seven parameters to target the following moments: the capital–
output ratio, the fraction of entrepreneurs in the population, the fraction of entrepreneurs exiting entrepreneurship during 
each period, the fraction of workers becoming entrepreneurs during each period,7 the ratio of median net worth of en-
trepreneurs to that of workers, the fraction of people with zero wealth, and the fraction of entrepreneurs hiring workers on 
the labor market. We choose the other two parameters to match the revenue from estate and gift taxes and the fraction of 
the estates that pay estate taxes. Table 2 reports the target values from the data and the values generated from our model; 
Table 3 reports the parameter values used in our calibration.
For the capital–output ratio, we use the Federal Reserve Board Flow of Funds Accounts. We deﬁne capital as tangible 
assets excluding consumer durables, federal, state, and local government assets. The measure thus includes equipment and 
software, structures, both residential and nonresidential, and inventories. Equipment and software is measured at replace-
ment cost; structures are measured at market value (except nonresidential structures owned by the ﬁnancial sector, for 
which market value information is not recorded). With this deﬁnition, the ratio for the available years (1960–2009) is 2.96. 
Excluding the data after 2000, years that experienced ﬁrst a large increase and then a drop in house values, the ratio is 
slightly smaller, about 2.89.
The fraction of entrepreneurs in the population, the probability of entering and exiting entrepreneurship, the ratio of 
the median wealth of an entrepreneur to that of a non-entrepreneur, and the fraction of entrepreneurs hiring workers are 
computed from the 1989 Survey of Consumer Finances (other waves give similar results). We compute the transition matrix 
between entrepreneurship and non-entrepreneurship by looking at households that are present in two consecutive surveys.
7 Both in the model and in the data, entry and exit rates refer only to people who were in the model (or survey) in both periods and transitioned from 
one occupation to the other; they do not include people who die while running an enterprise, nor people who start their enterprise at the beginning of 
their economic life. For this reason, entry, exit, and the steady-state fraction of entrepreneurs are not linked by the identity that would hold in an economy 
with inﬁnitely-lived agents.M. Bassetto et al. / Review of Economic Dynamics 18 (2015) 53–76 63
Fig. 2. Distribution of wealth, conditional on wealth being positive, for the whole population. Dashed line: data; solid line: model.
Fig. 3. Distribution of wealth, conditional on wealth being positive, for the entrepreneurs. Dashed line: data; solid line: model.
The fraction of the population at zero wealth, also computed from the SCF, is somewhat sensitive to the exact cutoff 
point (whether exactly zero, or some positive but small amount such as $100). This fraction varies from roughly 7% to 
13%. The percentage of entrepreneurs hiring workers (besides themselves and, possibly, their spouse) is also computed from 
the SCF.
We do not use the statutory exemption and tax schedule to model the estate tax. As explained in Cagetti and De Nardi
(2009) and in the references therein, the effective tax rate can differ substantially from the statutory one. We thus calibrate 
the exemption level and the (ﬂat) tax rate above the exemption to match the percentage of estates that pay an estate tax 
(2%) and the total amount of revenues of estate and gift taxes (about 0.2–0.3% of GDP).
5. A discussion of the steady state, the ﬁt of the model, and its mechanisms
As shown in Cagetti and De Nardi (2006, 2009), our model of entrepreneurship, although simple, matches very well the 
wealth distributions of both entrepreneurs and workers. In the presence of borrowing constraints, this is very important to 
determine the response to ﬁnancial shocks for both the whole distribution of entrepreneurs and for the important macroe-
conomic aggregates. Figs. 2 and 3 compare the distribution of net worth for workers and entrepreneurs generated by the 
model and in the actual SCF data and conﬁrm that the model generates the long upper tail of the wealth distribution that 
is observed in the data for the whole population, as well as the large wealth holdings concentrated in the hands of a few 
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Table 4
Workers hiring in the SCF data and in the model.
Labor hiring 25% 50% 75% 90% 95%
2007 SCF data, number of workers 0 1 5 18 49
Model, number of 33rd percentile workers 0 0.6 5.0 15 27
Model, number of median workers 0 0.4 2.9 8.81 6
Fig. 4. Left panel: Investment as a function of one’s net worth (in multiples of average yearly income). Right panel: Borrowing as a function of one’s assets.
Baseline model and model with tighter borrowing constraints.
In our calibration, the entrepreneurial sector employs about 57% of the capital, a little over the value reported by the 
Small Business Administration (which is about 50%).8 It also employs 33% of the eﬃciency units of labor in the economy; 
in the data, the Small Business Administration reports that the entrepreneurial sector employs almost 50% of the workers
in the economy; in the data, larger (corporate) ﬁrms tend to pay more, which helps in closing this gap. Table 4 displays 
the distribution of labor hiring by entrepreneurial ﬁrms. The ﬁrst line is computed from the 2007 SCF data, which is the 
last survey year before the crisis (the numbers from previous years are very similar). The question asked in the SCF is how 
many workers the entrepreneurs hire in their ﬁrm (we exclude the entrepreneur and his or her spouse). To compare it with 
the model, we assume that the average employee of the entrepreneurial ﬁrm (up to the 95% quantile) lies at either the 33rd 
percentile (second line) or the median of the eﬃciency distribution (third line) and that he works full time. Given that some 
of the employees in the SCF data will be part time, we conclude that the distribution of hiring by entrepreneurial ﬁrms in 
the model matches the one in the data reasonably well.
To better understand the workings of the model, the left-hand-side panel of Fig. 4 reports maximum investment as 
a function of one’s net worth (expressed in terms of multiples of average income) for a young entrepreneur of median 
worker ability. Until the entrepreneur owns enough assets, he keeps being a worker and does not enter entrepreneurship. 
For this reason, both investment and leverage are reported as being zero until the entry point. The solid line refers to 
the benchmark economy, while the dashed line refers to an economy in which the enforcement frictions become tighter 
( f = 0.80, up from 0.75). The picture shows that tighter borrowing constraints do not shift the amount of resources that 
one needs to hold to ﬁnd it proﬁtable to enter entrepreneurship: the tightening of the constraint discourages entry, but at 
the same time it induces a lower interest rate, which has a countervailing effect. Even though entry occurs at similar wealth 
levels, tighter borrowing constraints result in smaller investment and leverage and slow business growth. In the aggregate 
economy, slower-growing ﬁrms result in less capital accumulation and less inequality. The capital–output ratio in steady 
state drops from 3.0 to 2.9, the Gini coeﬃcient drops from 0.81 to 0.79, and the share of net worth held by the richest 1% 
drops from 28.4% to 26.4%.
In the data, entrepreneurs are much richer than workers, and their saving rate does not quickly decline with wealth. To 
match these facts, the calibration implies borrowing limits that are tight compared with the optimal ﬁrm size, hence the 
growth process of entrepreneurial ﬁrms is slow. This plays an important role for the response of the economy to various 
shocks, to which we now turn.
8 The ﬁgures from the Small Business Administration refer to independent businesses having fewer than 500 employees. This deﬁnition is a reasonable, 
but not perfect match with our entrepreneurs.M. Bassetto et al. / Review of Economic Dynamics 18 (2015) 53–76 65
6. Computing transitions: the shocks and their effects
Throughout the experiments below, we start the economy at the deterministic steady state in period 1. We trace the 
response to a temporary change in the technology or credit parameters (a “shock”) that lasts for three years, from period 2 
to period 4. This path is known by all agents at the beginning of period 2, before any decision is made.
The sequence of events within a period is as follows:
• Capital markets open; entering entrepreneurs liquidate their positions in corporate stock and government debt to in-
vest in their own business and borrow from intermediaries; workers and retirees (both from the previous period as 
well as exiting entrepreneurs) absorb these positions and lend to the intermediaries. Corporate ﬁrms raise funds from 
intermediaries according to their constraint (3) and deposit any internal funds in excess.9
• Corporate ﬁrms and entrepreneurs hire workers, and production takes place.
• Wages, taxes, and dividends are paid, loans are repaid, and the government issues new debt.
• Households consume, and government spending occurs.
For each experiment, we isolate the effects of taxes and interest-rate changes by proceeding as follows. First, we keep 
lending rates, taxes, and government debt ﬁxed at the initial steady-state level and we let government expenditure adjust to 
balance the government budget constraint. Second, we let lending rates clear the capital market in a closed economy, while 
we still keep taxes and government debt ﬁxed at the initial steady-state level, with government spending acting again as a 
residual. Finally, we consider an experiment where government spending is ﬁxed, and both taxes and interest rates adjust. 
In particular, we increase the proportional component of the tax schedule (τ s
t ) after the end of the ﬁnancial shock, in years 
six through 14, to balance the present-value budget constraint of the government. We are interested in this comparison 
to understand the way in which taxes affect entrepreneurial incentives; a meaningful welfare comparison between cuts in 
government spending and increases in tax rates is not possible in our model, since by assumption government spending is 
wasted.
6.1. Negative technology shock in the intermediation sector
We consider the effect of a shock that increases φ from 1.5% to 3.5% for three years.10
This is a way of capturing either of two alternative shocks:
• More monitoring is necessary to ensure loan performance due to the ﬁnancial turmoil.
• φ stands in as payments to a factor that is ﬁxed in the short run and that is temporarily depleted. As an example, 
suppose that banks face capital requirements and that some initial losses wipe some of the capital out, constraining 
the banks’ ability to offer additional intermediation services. In this case, the increase in φ would reﬂect the additional 
reward for the scarcer banking capital.11
Fig. 5 shows the effect of the ﬁnancial intermediation shock on the number of entrepreneurs and their average ﬁrm 
size. The fraction of entrepreneurs drops, particularly when taxes adjust, but this margin is not very persistent: when 
intermediation costs and taxes are back to normal, entrepreneurs quickly reenter the market. This is because the minimum 
ﬁrm size that makes entry proﬁtable is small, and potential entrepreneurs can save to reach that point quickly. Average ﬁrm 
size also drops; this effect is bigger and much more persistent. The intermediation cost reduces the entrepreneurs’ cash ﬂow 
and their ability to retain earnings to foster their business’ growth. Since both the wealth distribution and the distribution 
of assets across ﬁrms that we match are very spread out, our model implies a very gradual growth of ﬁrms, with almost 
no entrepreneur attaining suﬃcient wealth that borrowing constraints cease to bind. It follows that any negative shock has 
almost a permanent effect on each entrepreneur and its aggregate impact vanishes fully only when each entrepreneur loses 
his ability and closes the ﬁrm. As soon as the shock is over, ﬁrm growth resumes, but at a slow pace dictated by the tight 
borrowing limits.
The alternative ways in which taxes, spending, and interest rates adjust across the three experiments reveal important 
differences. Consider ﬁrst the cases in which taxes are held ﬁxed, and government spending acts as a residual. Fig. 6 plots 
the borrowing and lending rates for the case in which the lending rate is held ﬁxed (a small open economy) and that 
in which the capital market clears. During the periods of the shock, borrowing rates spike higher when savers have the 
opportunity of earning a ﬁxed rate abroad. As a consequence, in Fig. 5, average ﬁrm size drops more when lending rates 
are held constant (solid line) than when the effect of the shock is spread between borrowers and savers, as in general 
9 For period 2, we assume that the interest rate on government debt between periods 1 and 2 is also reset at this stage, even though debt is issued 
at the end of the previous period. Results are very similar if we assume that the rate of return on government debt is predetermined; in this case, the 
government would not beneﬁt from the drop in i2 and taxes would have to be slightly higher to balance the budget.
10 For a comparison, the spread between Baa corporate bonds and Treasuries jumped to more than 5% after the recent crisis and decreased only gradually 
over the course of 2009.
11 To spell out this story completely, we should explain what prevents capital from immediately ﬂowing back into the banking sector.66 M. Bassetto et al. / Review of Economic Dynamics 18 (2015) 53–76
Fig. 5. Number of entrepreneurs (left) and average size of entrepreneurial ﬁrms (right) in response to a shock to φ. Steady state = 100. Solid line: ﬁxed 
lending rate, government spending adjusts. Dashed line: general equilibrium, government spending adjusts. Dotted line: general equilibrium, taxes adjust.
Fig. 6. Evolution of interest rates in response to a shock to φ when government spending adjusts: experiment with a ﬁxed lending rate (solid = lending 
rate, dotted = borrowing rate) and general equilibrium (dashed = lending rate, dash-dotted = borrowing rate).
equilibrium (dashed line). The difference between partial and general equilibrium reverses after the shock is over. The shock 
triggers a reduction in aggregate capital; in general equilibrium, the resulting higher interest rates impair the entrepreneurs’ 
ability to rebuild their balance sheet and lead to a slower recovery in ﬁrm size.
The differences between the solid and dashed lines in Fig. 5 are minor compared with the differences between either of 
those lines and the dotted line, which represents the case in which the government balances its budget by increasing taxes 
rather than cutting government spending. To balance the budget, the government needs an increase in the tax rate of about 
1.5% for nine years. The government imbalance does not have a large impact on the depth of the initial recession, but it 
causes a prolonged slump once the ﬁscal adjustment takes place. In our model, taxes work very similarly to the interme-
diation shock that is the original disturbance: Both changes deprive entrepreneurs of the cash ﬂow which is the source of 
growth for their ﬁrms. As a consequence, when taxes increase, the average ﬁrm size of entrepreneurs suffers from a gradual 
contraction whose cumulative effect is several times larger than the original, shorter-lived shock. The gradual erosion of 
entrepreneurial wealth has a corresponding effect on GDP, both because it depresses capital accumulation (through lower 
interest rates) and because it shifts capital and labor towards less productive uses in the corporate sector. In the short run, 
investment takes a greater hit than consumption. However, as the period of high taxes drags on, a smaller ﬁrm size implies 
greater marginal product of capital, which acts as a countervailing force and prevents further falls in investment. In contrast, 
the impact on consumption, which is initially more muted, compounds over time, so that, by the end of the period of high 
taxes, consumption and investment have dropped approximately by the same amount relative to their steady-state level.M. Bassetto et al. / Review of Economic Dynamics 18 (2015) 53–76 67
Fig. 7. Value added in the corporate sector (solid) and entrepreneurial sector (dashed), in response to a shock to φ. Left panel: general equilibrium with 
government spending adjusting. Right panel: general equilibrium with taxes adjusting. Steady state = 100.
The recovery from the double shock of an increase in the intermediation cost and the subsequent response in taxes is 
delayed compared with what happens when government spending is cut, and it starts from a weaker position.
Fig. 7 compares value added in the entrepreneurial vs. the corporate sector of the economy. Since both sectors use cap-
ital intermediated by the ﬁnancial sector, their value added drops when the cost of accessing the intermediaries’ services 
increases. For our calibration, entrepreneurs are more reliant on ﬁnancial intermediation, and the drop in their value added 
is twice as large as that for the corporate sector. In period ﬁve the borrowing-cost shock is over and the effect reverses. 
In this period, the value added in the entrepreneurial sector grows faster than in the corporate sector; nonetheless, en-
trepreneurs do not recover fully, while the corporate sector stages a full recovery. The difference across the two sectors is 
due to the nature of the credit frictions faced by the two types of ﬁrms. Entrepreneurs are primarily constrained by their 
net worth, which can only be rebuilt slowly, whereas corporate ﬁrms curtail their investment only because of the additional 
cost of borrowing in Eq. (8), a period-by-period cost that returns almost to normal as soon as intermediation costs revert 
to their steady-state level. From period ﬁve, the two economies in Fig. 7 diverge. When (wasteful) government spending 
acts as the residual (left panel), no further shock perturbs the entrepreneurs’ wealth accumulation, and the economy im-
mediately starts on a path of slow convergence back to the steady state. In contrast, when taxes adjust, their effect on the 
entrepreneurs’ balance sheet tightens the constraint on entrepreneurial ﬁrm size and results in a reallocation of resources 
from entrepreneurs to corporate ﬁrms.
Due to computational limitations related to the endogenous borrowing constraints, our model features an inelastic labor 
supply, and thus it cannot capture the decline in labor occurring during the downturn. However, we can analyze the relative 
allocation of labor across the two sectors, which we show in Fig. 8. This picture mirrors what we observed for output: The 
recession caused by the ﬁnancial shock shrinks the share of employment at entrepreneurial ﬁrms, in line with Gertler and 
Gilchrist (1994), who observe that small ﬁrms are more sensitive to the business cycle.
Our results are also in line with what Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2012) ﬁnd, that small ﬁrms grow comparatively faster 
early in the recovery; this is particularly clear in the left panel of Fig. 8, where the prolonged slump due to the increase 
in taxes is absent. The comparatively fast growth in employment at entrepreneurial ﬁrms is partially compensating for the 
losses occurred during the recession, but it is not enough to close the gap in levels: In our model, employment in the sector 
remains depressed for a long time.12
Our results about relative employment levels mimic the Business Employment Dynamics data on employment by ﬁrm 
size  published  by  the  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics  and  the  results  by  Siemer (2013).  The  dataset  does  not  identify  en-
trepreneurial ﬁrms per se, but, as a proxy, we can look at ﬁrms by number of employees. Fig. 9 shows that the ratio 
of employment at ﬁrms with fewer than a certain number of employees relative to employment at ﬁrms with more than 
the same threshold number fell sharply during the 2007–2008 recession, indicating that small ﬁrms shrank more than larger 
ones. In addition, after the initial fall, the ratio has moved up only slowly, and remains below its pre-recession level even 
several years into the recovery, indicating that the effect of the shock is particularly persistent for small ﬁrms.
Having analyzed the forces that drive the behavior of our economy, we now turn to their aggregate implications. Fig. 10
plots aggregate GDP. The increase in intermediation costs (an intermediate input in our economy) depresses TFP and output 
12 Fort et al. (2013) show that Moscarini and Postel-Vinay’s pattern is especially due to young ﬁrms; these ﬁrms are most likely to face the credit 
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Fig. 8. Employment in the entrepreneurial sector, relative to the corporate sector, in response to a shock to φ. Left panel: general equilibrium with govern-
ment spending adjusting. Right panel: general equilibrium with taxes adjusting. Steady state = 100.
Fig. 9. Employment at ﬁrms with fewer than a certain number of employees, relative to the employment at ﬁrms with more than the given number, for 
different cutoff points. Fourth quarter of 2007 = 100.
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Business Employment Dynamics.
during the ﬁnancial shock. This is particularly true when lending rates are ﬁxed, since in this case capital moves out of the 
economy.13 In general equilibrium, the output drop on impact is mostly driven by the TFP effect of the shock: The drop in 
output is close to 3%, with 0.3% being due to the misallocation of factors. As the net worth of entrepreneurs is eroded, the 
misallocation becomes a more prominent force; after the shock is over, the entire difference between the solid line and the 
steady state is due to this misallocation, whereas in general equilibrium (dashed and dotted line) the decrease in capital 
accumulation plays a role. When taxes hit the entrepreneurs’ ability to accumulate wealth and grow their own business, the 
economy fares much worse. This second dip would be less pronounced with a longer transition period over which taxes are 
raised; but, of course, in this case the policy response to the shock would have even more persistent effects.
Fig. 11 plots aggregate consumption and investment.14 As in most business-cycle models, investment bears the brunt 
of the shock at ﬁrst. Nonetheless, consumption drops too. Unlike a pure tightening of borrowing constraints, a shock to 
ﬁnancial intermediation entails real output costs that reduce total available resources from the outset. In general equilibrium, 
the behavior of aggregate investment contributes to a slow recovery: After the initial drop in the periods of the shock, 
investment never overshoots its steady-state level. When government spending adjusts, investment merely returns close to 
13 National output declines much less, since the capital invested abroad continues to earn a rate of return.
14 We do not plot aggregate investment for the case of ﬁxed lending rates. In this case, the shock triggers a large capital outﬂow, and the drop in domestic 
investment happens on a much bigger scale, reversing itself after the intermediation shock is over. We do not view these international ﬂows as realistic, 
but we are interested in this experiment purely as a way to isolate the effects of interest rate movements on the economic incentives of the actors of our 
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Fig. 10. GDP in response to a shock to φ. Solid line: ﬁxed lending rate, government spending adjusts. Dashed line: general equilibrium, government spending 
adjusts. Dotted line: general equilibrium, taxes adjust. Steady state = 100.
Fig. 11. Aggregate consumption (left panel) and investment (right panel) in response to a shock to φ. Solid line: ﬁxed lending rate, government spending 
adjusts. Dashed line: general equilibrium, government spending adjusts. Dotted line: general equilibrium, taxes adjust. Steady state = 100.
steady state; when taxes further depress wealth accumulation, investment remains 2% below its steady state several years 
after taxes have returned to their steady-state level.
It has often been remarked that, during the crisis, credit standards were extremely tight and businesses found it diﬃcult 
to access credit at any price (see, for example, the Quarterly Senior Loan Oﬃcer Opinion Survey conducted by the Federal 
Reserve Board). A similar effect arises in our model: The increase in intermediation costs is accompanied by an endogenous
tightening of the constraints, because entrepreneurship becomes less proﬁtable and thus the temptation of terminating the 
business and absconding with part of the capital becomes stronger. To illustrate this mechanism, we run an alternative 
experiment, where intermediation costs increase by the same amount and duration (2% for three years), but borrowing 
constraints are held ﬁxed exogenously at their steady-state values. Fig. 12 compares the effect of the intermediation shock 
for exogenous and endogenous borrowing constraints with government spending acting as a residual. It shows that the 
adjustments of the extensive margin are almost exclusively driven by the tightening of the borrowing limits, which forces 
potential entrepreneurs to accumulate more wealth before entry becomes worthwhile. The proﬁt loss from the intermedi-
ation shock leads to smaller ﬁrms even with ﬁxed borrowing constraints, but the drop in average ﬁrm size is about half 
as large. After the shock, the speed of recovery is similar, but the level from which the economy has to recover is much 
lower with endogenous borrowing constraints, so that it takes longer to return to the same level of output. The behavior 
of GDP with endogenous vs. ﬁxed borrowing limits (Fig. 13) mirrors the one for the average size of ﬁrms, but quanti-
tatively the tightening of borrowing constraints has a more muted impact in the periods of the shock. When the shock 70 M. Bassetto et al. / Review of Economic Dynamics 18 (2015) 53–76
Fig. 12. Number of entrepreneurs (left) and average size of entrepreneurial ﬁrms (right) in response to a shock to φ with borrowing constraints held ﬁxed 
(solid line) and allowed to vary endogenously (dashed line). Steady state = 100. General equilibrium, government spending adjusts.
Fig. 13. GDP in response to a shock to φ with borrowing constraints held ﬁxed (solid line) and allowed to vary endogenously (dashed line). Steady state =
100. General equilibrium, government spending adjusts.
is active, both entrepreneurs and corporate ﬁrms are subject to it, and holding borrowing limits ﬁxed only beneﬁts en-
trepreneurs. After the shock is over, the gap between the two lines widens, because the persistent effect of the shock is 
dictated by the evolution of entrepreneurial wealth, which is less severely impacted when borrowing constraints are held 
ﬁxed.
Figs. 14 and 15 compare the behavior of entrepreneurial ﬁrms and GDP with endogenous vs. ﬁxed borrowing constraints 
in the case in which the government raises taxes to balance its budget. The differences are starker here, because an increase 
in taxes drains the proﬁtability of entrepreneurs and generates its own credit crunch if borrowing constraints are allowed 
to adjust endogenously.
6.2. Negative technology shock in the intermediation sector, only for entrepreneurs
In the wake of the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008, the government took several actions aimed at restoring calm in several 
ﬁnancial markets. Among the actions that were most successful ex-post was a blanket guarantee of money market mutual 
funds, and thus, indirectly, of the commercial paper of corporate industrial ﬁrms that those funds purchased. More generally, M. Bassetto et al. / Review of Economic Dynamics 18 (2015) 53–76 71
Fig. 14. Number of entrepreneurs (left) and average size of entrepreneurial ﬁrms (right) in response to a shock to φ with borrowing constraints held ﬁxed 
(solid line) and allowed to vary endogenously (dashed line). Steady state = 100. General equilibrium, taxes adjust.
Fig. 15. GDP in response to a shock to φ with borrowing constraints held ﬁxed (solid line) and allowed to vary endogenously (dashed line). Steady state =
100. General equilibrium, taxes adjust.
companies with direct access to markets seemed better able to cope than those that were forced to go through the banking 
sector.15
In this section, we consider the same shock to φ as in the previous section, but we assume that the government neu-
tralizes its impact on the corporate sector; we do so by varying ξt to hold ξtφt constant throughout. We take the best-case 
scenario in which this policy comes at no cost, in the way this happened with the money market guarantee ex-post.16
Fig. 16 studies the differences between this experiment and the case of a pure shock to φ for the entrepreneurial sector, 
in the case of general equilibrium and ﬁxed taxes (with government spending adjusting as a residual). Since corporate ﬁrms 
are insulated from the shock in this new experiment, entrepreneurs face stiffer competition in the factor markets, which 
thins their ranks and leads them to shrink their ﬁrm size more. The recovery is affected by two opposite forces. The greater 
hit taken by entrepreneurs slows the return to the steady state. However, aggregate investment (Fig. 17) drops less when 
only one sector is hit by the shock, and the additional capital is beneﬁcial to the recovery. The ﬁrst force dominates in the 
short run, but about ﬁve years after the shock the two experiments become quite similar.
15 For instance, data from the Flow of Funds accounts show that bond issuance for large corporations recovered quickly after the ﬁnancial crisis, while 
bank lending remained subdued for several years.
16 We could easily add a cost to this guarantee, in which case taxes would have to go up more during the transition and would exacerbate the persistence 
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Fig. 16. Number of entrepreneurs (left) and average size of entrepreneurial ﬁrms (right) in response to a shock to φ and ξ simultaneously (solid line), and 
to φ only (dashed line). Steady state = 100. General equilibrium, government spending adjusts.
Fig. 17. Aggregate investment in response to a shock to φ and ξ simultaneously (solid line), and to φ only (dashed line). Steady state = 100. General 
equilibrium, government spending adjusts.
Fig. 18 displays the value added in the two sectors in response to the shock to φ and the contemporaneous offset 
through ξ. When the corporate sector is completely insulated, its size actually expands during the ﬁnancial disruption, as it 
poaches workers and capital from the entrepreneurs.
Fig. 19 shows how all of these effects combine to determine aggregate GDP. Even in the best-case scenario, in which 
the government intervention entails no cost, it is successful at reducing the severity of the recession but it has almost no 
impact on the recovery. By helping the corporate sector, the government exacerbates the misallocation of resources due to 
ﬁnancial frictions.
6.3. A shock to required collateral
Here, we consider a shock that increases the collateral that the entrepreneurs need to secure their loans. Speciﬁcally, we 
raise the fraction of capital with which entrepreneurs can abscond ( f ) from 75% to 80%. We calibrate this shock to have an 
effect on aggregate output during the credit crunch that is of similar magnitude of the drop that we obtained considering a 
shock to φ for the cases of general equilibrium. This can be seen in Fig. 20.17
17 For brevity, we present only the case in which government spending adjusts to restore budget balance. The conclusions that we draw for this case 
apply also to the case in which taxes adjust instead.M. Bassetto et al. / Review of Economic Dynamics 18 (2015) 53–76 73
Fig. 18. Value added in the corporate sector (solid) and entrepreneurial sector (dashed), in response to a shock to φ and ξ simultaneously. Steady state =
100. General equilibrium with government spending adjusting.
Fig. 19. GDP in response to a shock to φ and ξ simultaneously (solid line), and to φ only (dashed line). Steady state = 100. General equilibrium, government 
spending adjusts.
Since this shock only affects the entrepreneurial sector, matching the output drop on impact requires a much deeper 
contraction in the number of entrepreneurs and ﬁrm size when  f increases than the baseline case in which borrowing 
costs increase for both entrepreneurs and corporate ﬁrms. This can be seen in Fig. 21. It might seem surprising that the 
deeper contraction in entrepreneurial ﬁrms does not bear bigger implications for the entrepreneurs’ wealth in the recovery 
phase. The reason for this result is that a shock to  f hits only the marginal proﬁts of the ﬁrm: It forces entrepreneurs to 
shrink their scale, but it has no effect on their proﬁts for a given scale of operations. In contrast, an increase in φ raises the 
rental rate of capital paid by entrepreneurs. This effect applies to all of the capital that they rent and has a negative effect 
on their proﬁts even conditioning on their scale of operations.
6.4. A TFP shock
We ﬁnally contrast a credit shock to a TFP shock that hits both the corporate sector and the entrepreneurial sector. In 
this case, TFP drops by 2.5% for three years, and subsequently reverts to steady state. Once again, the magnitude of the TFP 
drop is chosen so as to obtain a similar GDP drop on impact in general equilibrium. As Figs. 22 and 23 show, the evolution 
of the economy under this shock is fairly similar to that of a shock to φ.74 M. Bassetto et al. / Review of Economic Dynamics 18 (2015) 53–76
Fig. 20. GDP in response to a shock to f (solid line) and φ (dashed line). Steady state = 100. General equilibrium, government spending adjusts.
Fig. 21. Number of entrepreneurs (left) and average size of entrepreneurial ﬁrms (right) in response to a shock to f (solid line) and φ (dashed line). Steady 
state = 100. General equilibrium, government spending adjusts.
7. Conclusion
From the experiments that we ran, we learn three lessons. First and foremost, we ﬁnd that it is not the source of the 
disturbance that determines our economy’s speed of recovery, but rather the way in which the shock affects the proﬁtability 
of credit-constrained entrepreneurs. Recovery is slowest in the case of an increase in borrowing rates from which the 
corporate sector is shielded (our experiment of Section 6.2). Among our experiments, this one has the shallowest recession; 
and yet during the recovery output is at a similar level as that of the others, in which the economy needs to make up for 
deeper drops. When losses are concentrated in the entrepreneurial sector, it takes more time for entrepreneurs to rebuild 
their balance sheet.
Second, the way public ﬁnances adjust in response to the shortfalls caused by a recession is important. Income taxes are 
a further drain on the cash ﬂow available for successful business owners to grow and represent a further signiﬁcant drag 
on the economy. From an eﬃciency perspective, entrepreneurship subsidies would contribute to increasing output. It should 
be noted that this does not necessarily imply that subsidizing entrepreneurs is an optimal policy. Even if it were easy 
to identify the exact counterpart to credit-constrained, highly productive entrepreneurs, this policy would require taxing 
workers, who are on average far poorer in our economy, as in the data, to subsidize comparatively richer business owners, 
raising equity considerations.
Finally, in an environment with endogenous borrowing constraints, ﬁnancial shocks that increase interest costs have two 
effects. The interest rate increase represents a direct drain on ﬁrms’ proﬁts. The indirect effect is that higher borrowing rates M. Bassetto et al. / Review of Economic Dynamics 18 (2015) 53–76 75
Fig. 22. GDP in response to a shock to TFP (solid line) and φ (dashed line). Steady state = 100. General equilibrium, government spending adjusts.
Fig. 23. Number of entrepreneurs (left) and average size of entrepreneurial ﬁrms (right) in response to a shock to TFP (solid line) and φ (dashed line). 
Steady state = 100. General equilibrium, government spending adjusts.
trigger a tightening of credit limits. Hence, for a given contraction in credit, ﬁnancial shocks that affect borrowing rates have 
potentially more severe implications than pure credit rationing.
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